By: Chinaza Politis
Volume IX – Issue II – Spring 2024
NB: This article was written between February 16th, 2024 and April 8th, 2024 and references the proposed rule about non-compete clauses that the Federal Trade Commission published in the Federal Register on January 5, 2023. This predates the final rule’s announcement on April 23, 2024. While changes were made in the final rule, it bears sufficient resemblance that much of the summary and analysis written in this article is still applicable. Barring any injunctions, the final rule will become effective 120 days after it is published in the Federal Register.
I. Introduction
On January 5, 2023 the Federal Trade Commission announced a landmark proposal for a new rule that would declare non-compete clauses an unfair method of competition, thus banning businesses from using them. [1] A non-compete clause is defined as “a contractual term between an employer and a worker that prevents the worker from seeking or accepting employment with a person, or operating a business, after the conclusion of the worker’s employment with the employer,” typically meaning that employees cannot work for or start a competing business within a certain geographic area and/or time period after leaving a job. [2] A survey published in 2019 by the Economic Policy Institute found between 27.8% and 46.5% of the workforce is subject to non-compete agreements. [3] Businesses use them as ways to protect proprietary information and the investments they put into the workers they have hired, though they have drawn media attention for what many consider to be an overbroad use. While they are most likely to be used in contracts with workers who are high-skill, high-wage, and have access to trade secrets, they still continue to be used with low-skill, low-wage employees, even in cases where the non-compete clause is unenforceable. [4] In its proposal for a new rule, the Federal Trade Commission cites cases of non-compete clauses being used for manufacturing workers, warehouse workers, and sandwich shop employees. [5] The Federal Trade Commission proposes adding a subchapter J, consisting of part 910, to chapter I in title 16 of the Code of Federal Regulations that would make it an unfair method of competition to enter into, represent, or maintain a non-compete clause with a worker, requiring businesses to rescind existing non-compete clauses and notify workers of the action within 180 days of the rule’s publication. [6]
It is important to consider this initiative in the broader context of the Federal Trade Commission's purpose and recent actions. This proposal is part of an unprecedented departure in behavior from the Federal Trade Commission’s actions under previous administrations. In a July 2021 Executive Order, President Joe Biden highlighted his intent to promote a fair and competitive marketplace through fighting back against consolidation and its negative effect on competition, workers, consumers, and small businesses. [7] In this, he explicitly criticizes non-compete agreements and encourages the Chair of the FTC to create rules in order to limit the “unfair use of non-compete clauses and other clauses or agreements that may unfairly limit worker mobility.” [8]
The Federal Trade Commission is made up of five Commissioners, one being designated as the Chairman, that are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. [9] No more than 3 Commissioners can be of the same party at any given point in time, [10] which has aided the Commission in maintaining a general bipartisan standing throughout its existence. [11] However, since 2021, with the appointment of Lina Khan as the Chairman, the Federal Trade Commission has seen agenda items being passed where the voting more strictly follows partisan lines than it has in the past. [12] Historically, Federal Trade Commission Chairmen have viewed their role as promoting consumer welfare, often in the form of analyzing how business’ behavior affects consumer price. [13] This was especially true after a period in the 1970s where attempts at rulemaking were limited by Congress and a period in the 1980s where the courts struck down attempts to police “unfair methods of competition.” [14] However, critics say this view is too “narrow.” [15] Khan has emphasized that the Federal Trade Commission “has a mandate to protect ‘consumers, workers and honest business owners’,” and promote a fair economy. [16] In being on the frontlines of the initiatives for reforming federal stances on competition and antitrust law, Khan has “redefined the battlefield” in using the Federal Trade Commission to promote competitive markets. [17] Ending non-compete clauses is an aspect of this reform for a number of reasons. Increased media attention called towards arguably unjust uses of non-compete clauses, [18] President Biden’s emphasis on protecting workers, [19] and the possibility that the use of non-compete agreements is growing [20] are reasons that the Federal Trade Commission is beginning to take actions against them.
II. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
i. Finding Non-Compete Clauses an Unfair Method of Competition
The notice of proposed rulemaking, published on January 19, 2023, provides an overview of general information, the Federal Trade Commission’s legal authority, an analysis on the reasoning behind, and details about the proposed rule to ban non-compete clauses. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act deems “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce” unlawful and empowers the Federal Trade Commission to prevent such acts [21] and Section 6(g) authorizes them to “make rules and regulations for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of” the Federal Trade Commission Act. [22] In Section IV, the Commission outlines the rationale behind finding non-compete clauses to be unfair methods of competition and in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. [23] While the Court has found facially unfair or inherently coercive conduct constitutes an unfair method of competition, [24] it has also found that coercive conduct that burdens commerce and restrictive conduct that negatively impacts competition can also count as a violation of Section 5, as according to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, Atlantic Refining, FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., L.G. Balfour Co. v. FTC, and Hastings Manufacturing Co. f. FTC. [25] Therefore, the Federal Trade Commission finds it has to prove that non-compete clauses negatively impact competitive conditions and are restrictive, and not that the rule is facially unfair, [26] in order to be able to restrict them. Non-compete clauses “facially restrain competition in the labor market,” [27] and are “exploitative and coercive” at the time of contracting and departure of the worker. [28]
Though the Federal Trade Commission addressed possible business justifications for using non-compete clauses in Section IV.B., they find it does not alter their view that non-compete clauses are methods of unfair competition. [29] Case precedent in Fashion Originator's Guild of America v. FTC, Atlantic Refining, and L.G. Balfour Co., establishes that the standard by which “business justifications can overcome a finding that conduct is an unfair method of competition” is extremely narrow. [30] With this in mind, the Commission suggests that common justifications for non-compete clauses, such as how they incentivise employers to invest in worker training or prevent the theft of trade secrets, either do not outweigh the Commission's interest in preventing unfair competition or do not have enough empirical evidence. [31] Furthermore, considering that there are other methods to limit trade secret theft, such as non-disclosure agreements and improving job satisfaction, [32] and that the states that have banned non-compete clauses are not seeing inordinate negative outcomes for their businesses, [33] the Commission finds there is insufficient evidence to suggest that businesses will be inordinately harmed by the proposed rule.
ii. Non-Compete Agreement Effect on Labor Markets
One of the areas of concern around non-compete agreements is their effect on the competitive conditions of the American labor market. The Federal Trade Commission estimates that “one in five American workers–or approximately 30 million workers” is subject to a non-compete clause. [34] Though studies differ on the exact prevalence and impact of non-compete clauses, the evidence shows that they are not uncommon and can negatively impact workers.
The Federal Trade Commission finds evidence to suggest that non-compete clauses are associated with depressed earnings. They point to six different studies that generally suggest a correlation between the non-enforcement of non-compete clauses and higher wages for the workers being studied, though it notes that they could not control other contributing factors. 35 Non-compete clauses’ effects on wages is likely a result of the long recognized unequal bargaining power between employers and employees. [36] Employers have far more power than employees in most cases when negotiating employment contracts. [37] This gap in power is widened by non-compete clauses because the bargaining power of non-union professions, which are often the ones most likely to be subject to non-compete clauses, stems from being able to threaten to quit and work for a competitor. When non-union employees are subject to a non-compete agreement, they lose the little leverage they have when bargaining their wages with employers.
Non-compete clauses do not solely affect the workers that are subject to them. The Commission also cites another two studies that find the use of non-compete clauses negatively impact the wages of workers that both are and are bound by them, noting similar limitations in these studies. [38] Non-compete clauses not only prevent workers from working for competitors, but they inevitably pressure workers to stay in their jobs, regardless of the conditions and compensation, because their job options upon their departure are limited, especially if they have a specialized skill set. [39] As a result, the amount of individuals in the labor market is artificially decreased, artificially lowering the amount of competition for work, [40] and preventing workers from being paired with their optimal employer. [41] This means that workers who are a better fit for a job won’t be able to apply for it because the employee in that job won’t leave it because they are bound by a non-compete. Furthermore, if the wages of workers bound by non-competes are depressed, then workers in similar jobs at other firms will struggle more in negotiating higher salaries because the average compensation for their work is being lowered.
The negative impacts of non-compete clauses on workers is not solely quantitative. It negatively impacts workers' lives, as it may force workers to choose between staying at an undercompensating job, unemployment, and moving their family to a different city to find similar work, even if there are local competitors that would otherwise be able to offer a better job.
Such cases are evidenced through the labor market for physicians. An article published in NBC on March 3, 2024 titled “How hospitals are fighting to keep their former doctors from seeing patients” outlines the application of non-compete agreements in the healthcare industry. [42] Both the American Medical Association and the American College of Physicians claim that non-compete agreements can "contribute to physician shortages, sever doctor-patient relationships, and deter doctors from speaking out for fear of being fired and unable to work elsewhere in the community.” [43] A 2023 report by the American Medical Association found that roughly 37% to 45% of physicians are subject to non-compete clauses, [44] and according to the president of the American College of Physicians, that number has been rising “exponentially over the last several years.” [45] Due to the conditions of the industry doctors hesitate to challenge unjust non-disclosure clauses out of fear of damage to their reputation, instead opting to move locations should they leave their employer. [46] These harms extend outside of the labor market alone. According to the executive director of the Georgia Obstetrics and Gynecology Society, non-competes are a contributing factor to the shortage of OB-GYNs within the state of Georgia, creating negative outcomes for women in the state. [47] Though there are certain business justifications for hospitals using non-compete clauses, as they invest a significant amount into training their physicians, [48] their negative impacts on the labor market and patient outcomes are vast.
The proposed rule to ban non-compete clauses is expected to have positive impacts on the labor market. In total, the Federal Trade Commission projects that “worker earnings would increase by $250- $296 billion annually” and expands on this through studies focusing on four specific types of workers. [49] First, a study conducted on high-tech workers in Hawaii found a rule limiting non-compete clauses would increase the average earnings of the workers by 4.8%. [50] Second, a study conducted on physicians projected that when comparing two physicians, one subject to a non-compete clause and one not, over a ten year period, the physician not subject to the non-compete agreement would project “earnings approximately 39% greater than the physician without.” [51] Third, a study conducted on Oregon’s hourly workers after a 2008 prohibition on non-compete clauses being used for hourly workers found an overall increase in their earnings by 2.3% and a 4.6% increase in wages where non-compete use was relatively high. [52] Fourth, a study found that CEOs would likely have their total compensation increase by 9.4% if the rule were adopted, though a second study produced murkier results. [53] For these four types of workers, who vary widely, the non-enforcement of non-compete clauses improves their compensation
iii. Non-Compete Agreement Effect on Consumer Markets
It is also expected to have significant impacts on the consumer product and service market. The Federal Trade Commission implies a connection between non-compete clauses and increased consumer prices, as it finds that non-compete clauses are linked to higher concentration, which decreases competition, and can raise prices. [54] As stated earlier, non-compete clauses limit business formation and the movement of workers between different companies. [55] This not only hurts the labor market, but the product market as well. Innovation is negatively impacted as these limitations prevent “knowledge flow between firms.” [56] Furthermore, anything that negatively impacts competition between firms reduces firms incentives to improve product or service quality or to reduce prices.
The proposed rule would increase competition in the product market, as more people would be allowed to pursue entrepreneurial endeavors and those who do would have more security in knowing there is a mobile labor market to draw talent from. [57] With the limitations of non-competes removed, innovation is also expected to increase. [58] Though they note that there are ambiguous expectations as to the effect it could have on consumer prices, as increased competition might lower prices but increased wages might raise prices, they do expect consumers to be better off overall as innovation could also lead to improved product quality and increased wages offsets increased prices. [59]
III. Opinion
Though I generally agree with the Federal Trade Commission’s arguments to why the government should take action to restrict non-compete agreements, I am not convinced that the action should be taken by the FTC. In Christine S. Wilson’s dissenting opinion, she outlines the legal challenges that might be raised against this rule. [60] She states that opponents can argue that this violates the non-delegation doctrine, which states that “Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to another branch of government.” [61] This is a highly plausible argument as similar codes were found improper in the past [62] and there have been multiple failed Congressional attempts to create legislation of the same effect. [63] She states that this will also trigger the major questions doctrine since the rule claims “the power to (1) resolve a matter of great political significance, (2) regulate a significant portion of the American economy, or (3) intrude in an area that is the particular domain of state law” and the courts may find that Congress did not intend to confer such authority to the FTC. [64] There is further evidence that Congress did not intend to provide the FTC with such power based on a past instance of rulemaking on competition and the Magnuson-Moss Act, which implied the FTC either never had rulemaking authority previously or only has rulemaking authority on consumer protection. [65] There are multiple avenues which draw into question whether the FTC has the right to make such a rule at all, which could lead to the rule being struck down in court and costly litigation when resources could be spent elsewhere. [66]
An additional reason that the Federal Trade Commission should not institute this rule is the lack of supporting research and legislative examples. For a rule that will have such an impact on a large number of workers, may possibly affect the economy and consumer prices, and affect businesses’ ability to protect their trade secrets, there should be a wealth of strong research to support such a rule being made by a non-elected body. However, there is a lack of research to draw substantive conclusions and the majority of the studies that are cited in the FTC’s proposal are not sufficiently conclusive. Though the studies in totality point towards restrictions on non-compete agreements being a wise decision, they do not indicate to what extent non-compete agreements should be limited to create the best result. The FTC requests for comments to help decide the scope of the rule, [67] further demonstrating that the existing evidence alone is not enough to conclude that a complete ban is the best extent of the rule. To create such an extreme rule is a hasty decision.
Further evidence exists that a total ban is a hasty escalation when analyzing the state of non-compete law across the states and the District of Columbia. Only four states have near total to total bans of non-compete clauses being used in employment contracts, those being California, Oklahoma, North Dakota, and Minnesota. [68] Minnesota’s ban only applies to contracts entered on or after July 1, 2023 [69] and California recently implemented significant changes in their ban. [70] Though these states have not seen significant negative outcomes from implementing these bans, it may be too early to conclude what the long term effects could be and it cannot be automatically assumed the outcomes will be exactly the same in other states. This is not to indicate that states do not acknowledge non-competes. In fact, since 2011 there have been 54 modifications to the non-compete laws of 30 different states and the District of Columbia [71] and the majority of states have some sort of limit or consideration of the time and space that non-competes can restrict, though the rules are often unspecific. [72] However, only 12 states have thresholds for the wage level for a non-compete to be allowed, [73] 9 require some form of notice to employees, [74] 11 have outlined the fees and penalties that might be associated with a violation, [75] 21 have outlined exceptions specifically for healthcare workers or physicians, [76] and a majority of more sweeping rules do not apply retroactively. [77] Both the consideration that non-compete clauses play different roles in different industries that have a varying degree of dependency on trade secrets and the fact that there is such variety in state legislation on non-compete clauses indicate that a one-size-fits-all federal approach for such a rule is likely not the best approach in the current climate. While so many states are actively updating their legislation regulating non-competes in a way that best fits their needs, there lacks a compelling argument that all non-competes need to be banned by the FTC at this time. Additionally, the fact that 29 of the 54 recent changes in non-compete clause law happened as recently as 2020 further shows that it is too early to definitively conclude the benefits of these changes.
Furthermore, while there are new restrictions on non-compete clauses being passed in states, this does not account for the failed attempts to pass such legislation. On multiple occasions since 2015 there have been Congressional attempts to create widespread bans on non-compete clauses, none of which have been signed into law yet. [78] In 2023 the Governor of New York vetoed a bill that would ban nearly all non-competes on the grounds that businesses’ interests could not be adequately accounted for with such a broad approach. [79] All this is to say that states are paying attention to non-compete clauses and are in the process of tailoring their laws to regulate these clauses with their state’s best interests in mind. The FTC is escalating the experimental process that these states are going through under the assumption that all states need the same rule and, in my opinion, is doing so without sufficient empirical evidence to suggest why they can and should create such a rule. Furthermore, organizations such as the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association would argue that non-compete clauses lack a sufficient substitute and that the way the proposal is written the de facto ban could possibly apply to the suggested substitutes. [80] The proposed rule states that though restrictive employment covenants like non-disclosure agreements would not be banned, it does clarify that overbroad uses of such covenants could be restricted, [81] which could confuse businesses on how to create contracts that comply with the rule and still sufficiently protect their trade secrets.
I do, however, believe that a ban on non-compete clauses should continue to be pursued. State legislatures should continue to create further restrictions on the use of non-compete clauses and measure the outcome of such restrictions. This will allow for businesses to adjust to such changes and for the FTC to have sufficient evidence to support a ban.
Endnotes
[1] Staff in the Office of Technology, “Non-Compete Clause Rulemaking,” Federal Trade Commission, January 5, 2023, https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/federal-register-notices/non-compete-clause-rulemaking.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Alexander J.S. Colvin and Heidi Shierholz, “Noncompete Agreements,” Economic Policy Institute, December 10, 2019, https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements/, 2.
[4] Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman D Bishara, “Noncompete Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force,” Journal of Law and Economics, 53-84, 64, no. 1 (October 12, 2020), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2625714, 1-15.
[5] Federal Trade Commission, “Non-Compete Clause Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Federal Register 88, no. 12 (January 19, 2023): 3483-3484, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00414/non-compete-clause-rule.
[6] Ibid at 3535-3536.
[7] “Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy,” The White House, July 9, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-on-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/.
[8] Ibid.
[9] “Commissioners, Chairwomen and Chairmen of the Federal Trade Commission ,” Federal Trade Commission, March 2023, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/commissioners/commissioner_chart_timeline.pdf.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Leah Nylen, “‘Unlike Anything I’ve Seen at the FTC’: Biden’s Chair Makes Her Public Debut,” Politico, July 1, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/01/ftc-lina-khan-antitrust-chair-497764.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Callum Jones, “‘She’s Going to Prevail’: FTC Head Lina Khan Is Fighting for an Anti-Monopoly America,” The Guardian, March 9, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2024/mar/09/lina-khan-federal-trade-commission-antitrust-monopolies?ref=upstract.com.
[16] Leah Nylen, “‘Unlike Anything I’ve Seen at the FTC’: Biden’s Chair Makes Her Public Debut,” Politico, July 1, 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/01/ftc-lina-khan-antitrust-chair-497764.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Federal Trade Commission, “Non-Compete Clause Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Federal Register 88, no. 12 (January 19, 2023): 3537, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00414/non-compete-clause-rule.
[19] “FACT SHEET: The American Jobs Plan,” The White House, March 31, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/31/fact-sheet-the-american-jobs-plan/
[20] Alexander J.S. Colvin and Heidi Shierholz, “Noncompete Agreements,” Economic Policy Institute, December 10, 2019, https://www.epi.org/publication/noncompete-agreements/, 10.
[21] 75 P.L. 447, 52 Stat. 111, 75 Cong. Ch. 49
[22] Federal Trade Commission, “Non-Compete Clause Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Federal Register 88, no. 12 (January 19, 2023): 3482, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00414/non-compete-clause-rule.
[23] Ibid at 3499.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid at 3449-3500.
[26] Ibid at 3500.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] Ibid at 3504.
[30] Ibid at 3505-3504.
[31] Ibid at 3505-2506.
[32] Ibid at 3506-3507.
[33] Ibid at 3507.
[34] Ibid at 3485.
[35] Ibid at 3486-3487.
[36] Ibid at 3502.
[37] Ibid at 3486.
[38] Ibid at 3488.
[39] Staff in the Office of Technology, “Non-Compete Clause Rulemaking,” Federal Trade Commission, January 5, 2023, https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/federal-register-notices/non-compete-clause-rulemaking.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Federal Trade Commission, “Non-Compete Clause Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Federal Register 88, no. 12 (January 19, 2023): 3486, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00414/non-compete-clause-rule.
[42] Shannon Pettypiece, “How Hospitals Are Fighting to Keep Their Former Doctors from Seeing Patients,” NBCNews.com, March 3, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/economics/hospitals-are-fighting-keep-former-doctors-seeing-patients-rcna134341.
[43] Ibid.
[44] Andis Robeznieks, “Ama Backs Effort to Ban Many Physician Noncompete Provisions,” American Medical Association, June 13, 2023, https://www.ama-assn.org/medical-residents/transition-resident-attending/ama-backs-effort-ban-many-physician-noncompete.
[45] Shannon Pettypiece, “How Hospitals Are Fighting to Keep Their Former Doctors from Seeing Patients,” NBCNews.com, March 3, 2024, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/economics/hospitals-are-fighting-keep-former-doctors-seeing-patients-rcna134341.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Federal Trade Commission, “Non-Compete Clause Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Federal Register 88, no. 12 (January 19, 2023): 3522-3523, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00414/non-compete-clause-rule.
[50] Ibid at 3523.
[51] Ibid at 3523-2524.
[52] Ibid at 3524.
[53] Ibid at 3524-3525.
[54] Ibid at 3490.
[55] Ibid at 3490-3491.
[56] Ibid at 3492.
[57] Ibid at 3526.
[58] Ibid at 3527.
[59] Ibid at 3527.
[60] Ibid at 3543-3545.
[61] Ibid at 3545.
[62] “The Changing Landscape of Trade Secrets Laws and Noncompete Laws Around the Country,” Fair Competition Law, April 21, 2024, https://faircompetitionlaw.com/changing-trade-secrets-noncompete-laws/.
[64] Federal Trade Commission, “Non-Compete Clause Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Federal Register 88, no. 12 (January 19, 2023): 3544, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00414/non-compete-clause-rule.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid at 3543-3545.
[67] Ibid at 3534.
[68] “50 State Noncompete Chart,” Beck Reed Riden LLP, February 19, 2024, https://beckreedriden.com/50-state-noncompete-chart-2/. The chart referenced in here and following citations from the same source come from a chart which is referenced by reputable news sources and government agencies. It summarized non-competition laws in the 50 states and the District of Columbia and was last updated February 19, 2024. It does not include an exhaustive description of the non-competition laws of every state and as such the exact numbers derived from the list may not be exact.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Russell Beck, “Noncompete Laws Changes since 2011,” Fair Competition Law, December 27, 2023, https://faircompetitionlaw.com/2023/12/27/noncompete-law-changes-since-2011/.
[71] Ibid.
[72] “50 State Noncompete Chart,” Beck Reed Riden LLP, February 19, 2024, https://beckreedriden.com/50-state-noncompete-chart-2/.
[73] Russel Beck, “Noncompete, Nonsolicit, No-Recruit Wage Criteria (for 2024),” Fair Competition Law, January 14, 2024, https://faircompetitionlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/BRR-20231203-State-Low-Wage-Worker-Criteria-Expected-for-2024-corrected-20240114.pdf.
[74] Russel Beck, “NONCOMPETE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS CHECKLIST – STATE BY STATE,” Fair Competition Law, February 5, 2023, https://faircompetitionlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Noncompete-Notice-Requirements-Chart-20230205-1.pdf.
[75] “50 State Noncompete Chart,” Beck Reed Riden LLP, February 19, 2024, https://beckreedriden.com/50-state-noncompete-chart-2/.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.
[78] “The Changing Landscape of Trade Secrets Laws and Noncompete Laws Around the Country,” Fair Competition Law, April 21, 2024, https://faircompetitionlaw.com/changing-trade-secrets-noncompete-laws/.
[79] Lyle Moran, “New York Likely to Pursue Noncompete Ban Again in 2024,” Legal Dive, January 4, 2024, https://www.legaldive.com/news/new-york-noncompete-ban-governor-hochul-veto-noncompetes-legislation/703693/.
[80] Bernard V Canepa and Lindsey Keljo, Re: Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Federal Trade Commission; Non-Compete Clause Rule; 88 Fed. Reg. 3482 (RIN: 3084-AB74) (January 19, 2023)., April 19, 2023, https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Notice-of-Proposed-Rulemaking-Federal-Trade-Commission-Non-Compete-Clause-Rule-88-Fed.-Reg.pdf, 2-8.
[81] Federal Trade Commission, “Non-Compete Clause Rule, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,” Federal Register 88, no. 12 (January 19, 2023): 3482, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/01/19/2023-00414/non-compete-clause-rule.