By: Allison Wong
Volume X – Issue I – Fall 2024
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 27th, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) v. Jarkesy et al. in a 6-3 ruling in favor of the respondents. [1] George Jarkesy Jr. created hedge funds in 2007 and 2009 with the financial backing of Patriot28 LLC. [2] On March 22, 2017, SEC pursued legal action against Jarkesy et al. for alleged overvaluation and other fraudulent claims. [3] Based on guidelines set by the federal antifraud provisions as well as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the SEC proceeded with an in-house adjudication process. [4] In response to the Administrative Law Judge’s decision to impose civil penalties, Jarkesy et al. petitioned the U.S. Fifth Circuit District Court of Appeals, where the decision was reversed and remanded. [5] The case brought up key issues regarding the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury, the difference between public and private rights, the boundaries of common law, separation of powers, and the nondelegation doctrine. In turn, the SEC appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which focused specifically on the Seventh Amendment in the majority opinion. [6] SEC v. Jarkesy matters because it examines the ability of government agencies to uphold regulations as well as Congress’s ability to delegate that responsibility. In combination, the Fifth Circuit and SCOTUS decisions in this case broaden both the depth and scope of its impact. Although the SCOTUS decision in SEC v. Jarkesy appropriately categorizes securities law as a private rights and common law concern, it fails to consider the potentially devastating impacts of its precedent. Based on the practical limitations of governmental institutions, this case develops a legal fantasy that works towards not only dissecting but also dismantling the current regulatory state.
II. BACKGROUND
. In response to the 1929 Wall Street Crash, Congress sought to raise transparency and accountability standards through the federal regulation of securities market investments. [7] The Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“antifraud provisions”) regulated securities registration, securities trading, and advisory disclosures. [8] Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Congress established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce federal securities regulations using two major mechanisms. [9] First, the SEC can file a suit against an alleged fraudulent investor in federal court, adjudicated by an Article III judge and jury. [10] Second, the SEC can adjudicate the suit in-house, using an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) without a jury. [11] While federal court proceedings adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) guidelines on evidence and discovery, SEC proceedings follow the Commission Rules of Practice, granting discretionary authority to the ALJ on fact-finding matters. [12]
The SEC was authorized to employ either adjudicatory forum for its legal proceedings. Breaches of federal securities laws are commonly remediated via imposition of civil penalties on parties exercising noncompliance. [13] The SEC was only able to levy these fines through federal courts until 2010 when Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”), opening either forum to civil penalty remediation. [14] The passage of Dodd-Frank initiated a shift towards SEC reliance on in-house over federal court adjudication. Before 2010, the SEC mainly used federal courts and adjudicated less than fifty-percent of its suits in-house. [15] In the four fiscal years following Dodd-Frank, the amount of in-house adjudications rose to over eighty-percent. [16] Across the same time period, SEC data reveals a ninety-percent success rate under in-house ALJs compared to only sixty-nine percent in federal courts. [17] These success-rate discrepancies in both initial and appellate rulings incentivize the SEC to employ in-house adjudication in a post-Dodd-Frank environment.
Utilizing ALJ adjudication is central to this case. Defendant George Jarkesy established hedge funds in 2007 and 2009 with the financial backing of Patriot28 LLC. [18] In total, they managed over twenty-four million dollars in financial assets across more than one-hundred investors. [19] In 2011, the SEC launched an investigation into the two hedge funds established by Jarkesy et al. [20] In 2017, the SEC began legal action alleging engagement in overvaluation and fraudulent material claims-making in violation of the antifraud provisions. [21] The SEC opted to adjudicate in-house, and the ALJ held that Jarkesy et al. violated federal securities laws and imposed three-hundred thousand dollars in civil penalties and six- hundred and eighty-five thousand dollars in disgorgement of illegal gains. [22] Following the ALJ’s ruling, Jarkesy et al. filed a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, contending a violation of the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. [23]
III. PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The right to trial by jury is enshrined by the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. [24] During British colonial rule over America, the British avoided using American juries by adjudicating within admiralty, vice admiralty, and chancery courts. [25] Especially in cases of legal enforcement, British colonial administrators received higher rates of favorable rulings in juryless tribunals. [26] Resentment over this practice was incorporated into the American fight for independence and the drafting of the U.S. Constitution. [27] Many of the founders did not believe that the judiciary, as outlined in Article III, adequately safeguarded the right to a fair trial.28 In Federalist No. 83, Alexander Hamilton argued that lack of a stronger right to trial by jury in civil cases was among the most substantial critiques against ratification. [29] The framers addressed this concern with the Seventh Amendment of the Bill of Rights, further guaranteeing the right of trial by jury. [30] The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment established the right to independent judges and juries as well as fair trial procedures. [31]
An exception to the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury exists for public rights which can be constitutionally adjudicated within juryless agencies. [32] Public rights involve legal claims related to the government such as revenue collection, Native American tribal relations, administration of public lands, and some areas of customs and immigration law. [33] Generally, the legislative and executive branches adjudicate public rights suits outside of the judicial system and jurisdiction of Article III courts. [34] Private rights, in contrast, are legal claims regarding private citizens resolved only under Article III courts. [35] The distinction between public and private rights is often delineated by the category of common law. Common law relies heavily on precedent developed by relevant court decisions, as used by Article III courts, rather than codified rules and guidelines, as used by administrative agencies delegated from legislative statutes. [36] During British colonial rule, civil penalties and traditional fraud suits were adjudicated in common-law courts and never in admiralty courts. [37] Common law, therefore, began to signify private rights and Article III designations. [38]
The nondelegation doctrine upholds the constitutional principle of separation of powers.39 Government power is divided between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches delineated by Articles I, II, and III of the Constitution, respectively. [40] In Federalist No. 47, James Madison argued the importance of these designations– the three branches must work together without encroaching on each other. [41] The nondelegation doctrine applies specifically to Congress, prohibiting the delegation of its Article I responsibilities outside of the legislative branch. [42] Law-making duties cannot be placed under the discretion of the executive branch, judicial branch, or private entity. [43] In J.W. Hampton v. United States (1928), SCOTUS ruled that, to abide by the nondelegation doctrine, Congress must provide an intelligible principle to federal regulatory agencies by sufficiently outlining what and how regulations ought to be enforced. [44]
IV. U.S. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
On May 18th, 2022, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded, affirming the constitutional violations Jarkesy et al. alleged against the SEC. [45] First, the Court ruled that the SEC use of an in-house proceeding violated the petitioners’ right to trial by jury. [46] The Seventh Amendment maintains this right for suits under common law, with Tull v. United States (1987) establishing that civil penalties meet the statutory requirement for common law remedies. [47] Atlas Roofing Company v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (1977) is cited as an example of when Congress can delegate agency adjudication to in-house, juryless processes for public rights. [48] In this particular argument, the Court contests that the suit against Jarkesy et al. belonged under SEC in-house proceedings, not the existence of the forum itself. Furthermore, Gran Financiera, S. A. v. Nordberg (1989) requires Congress to statutorily delineate public rights through language of the regulatory scheme delegated to an agency in order to meet the Seventh Amendment exception. [49]
Second, the Court ruled that Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by delegating government powers to the SEC in the absence of intelligible principle. [50] Dodd-Frank granted the SEC prosecutorial discretion in enforcing the law, a power vested in the executive branch, by allowing the agency choice in using Article III courts or in-house proceedings. [51] Mistretta v. United States (1989) requires that Congress provide an intelligible principle when delegating regulatory responsibilities. [52] Instead, Congress granted the SEC significant discretion in adjudication choices without explicit guidance on how to carry out regulatory powers. [53]
Third, the Court ruled that SEC ALJs violate Article II by encroaching on the executive powers constitutionally vested in the President. [54] Article II states that the President shall “take care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” [55] which the Court interpreted as having authority over the appointment and removal of ALJs. Precedent set by Myers v. United States (1926) [56] and Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. (2010) [57] both establish the President’s authority over executive officers. Lucia v. SEC (2018) categorized SEC ALJs constitutionally as “inferior officers” based on their enforcement duties. [58] Therefore, the Court holds that the current status of ALJs is unconstitutional based on barriers they construct against a President’s justified executive authority.
In response to this ruling, the SEC appealed the case up to the U.S. Supreme Court.
V. SCOTUS DECISION
In SEC v. Jarkesy, SCOTUS held that the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury must be maintained for the defendant when the SEC is imposing civil penalties on them for committing securities fraud. [59] The federal “antifraud provisions” enforced by the SEC categorize the Commission’s lawsuits under common law, necessitating the use of the Seventh Amendment. [60] Additionally, the SEC’s suit did not meet the grounds for a public rights exception to the right to trial by jury. The Court decided SEC v. Jarkesy by a 6-3 majority of Justices John G. Roberts Jr., Clarence Thomas, Samuel A. Alito Jr., Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett M. Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett. [61] Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and Ketanji Brown Jackson dissented. [62] Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. authored the majority opinion, Justice Neil M. Gorsuch authored a concurring opinion, and Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored the dissenting opinion. [63]
SCOTUS decided SEC v. Jarkesy solely on the grounds of the Seventh Amendment, without an examination of broader constitutional impacts in the majority opinion. [64] First, Roberts argued that the scope of the case is within common law and private rights, not public rights. In Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Company (1856), the Court held that issues concerning common lawsuits cannot be delegated out of the judicial system by Congress. [65] In SEC v. Jarkesy, the alleged violation of anti-fraud provisions is considered common law fraud and imposition of civil penalties on Jarkesy enters the realm of private rights. [66] An in-house ALJ adjudicating lawsuits within the SEC violates this precedent of when Congress can delegate outside the judicial system. [67] Furthermore, in Stern v. Marshall (2011), the Court held that a lawsuit within the bounds of federal jurisdiction has to be presided over by an Article III court. [68] Throughout SEC v. Jarkesy, debate arose over whether or not a civil penalties lawsuit was legally considered a traditional fraud claim, but under the precedent of common law designation, this distinction largely does not matter. Historically, both civil penalties and traditional fraud suits were adjudicated in common-law courts which makes the SEC’s suit undeniably under the issue of common law. [69] Additionally, there are many similarities between common law fraud and federal securities fraud, making the SEC’s suit fall under the issue of common law. [70] Both types of fraud aim to fight against lack of accuracy or lack of transparency in material facts. [71] In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo (2005) the Court established that elements of common law should be used to interpret lawsuits regarding federal securities laws. [72]
Second, in Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg (1989), the court held that Congress was not permitted to delegate legal proceedings to non-Article III courts without juries even under the Seventh Amendment’s public rights exception. [73] In Granfinanciera, actions of conveyance fraud under bankruptcy laws were dealt with in the absence of Article III bankruptcy judges and juries because Congress delegated those powers out of federal courts. [74] In SEC v. Jarkesy, the Granfinanciera precedent means that the Seventh Amendment cannot be outwardly dismissed simply because Congress created an administrative agency with the power to adjudicate its own suits. Throughout the case, the SEC has pushed against the use of Granfinanciera on the grounds that the federal government itself is party to the legal action and thereby the ALJs in the SEC are in a different position than the bankruptcy judges. [75] Even within public rights, however, in Northern Pipeline Construction Company v. Marathon Pipe Line Company (1982), the Court held that adjudication of lawsuits should still lean towards Article III decisions. [76] Northern Pipeline prioritizes the content of the lawsuit over who initiated it, where it was initiated, or how it was initiated. [77] The content of the SEC’s lawsuit against Jarkesy should therefore adhere to Granfinanciera guidelines. Atlas Roofing Company, Inc. v. Occupational Safety and Health Commission (1977) is an example of when the Court held the public rights exception to the Seventh Amendment. [78] As a boundary of the exception, the Court emphasized that alleged violation was outside the realm of common law and was therefore under public rights. [79] The content of the lawsuit adhered to the exception, not the mere fact that Congress had allowed an in-agency adjudication process to exist for the Occupational Safety and Health Commission. [80] In SEC v. Jarkesy, therefore, the mere existence of in- house proceedings under ALJs does not violate the Seventh Amendment nor does it relate to why the Court did not categorize the lawsuit under the public rights exception. It was the content of the alleged violation that affirmed its position in common law and the private rights sector.
In the concurring opinion, Gorsuch argues that the Seventh Amendment alone is not enough to justify ruling in favor of Jarkesy et al. [81] He believes that Article III and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause play key roles in what is considered a fair trial under the U.S. legal system. [82] Article III gives individuals the right to a trial with an independent judge, and Gorsuch discusses how the SEC’s use of their ALJs violates this right. [83] Under Dodd-Frank, civil penalties are placed under the discretion of the SEC Commissioners. [84] By the fact that the Commissioners initiated the lawsuit themselves, the idea of an independent decision maker no longer exists. Not only is the ALJ hired by the SEC, they lack the check of a jury because the ALJ decides the fact-finding process, evidence use, and legal justification. [85] SEC proceedings follow the Commission’s own rules of practice while the ALJ has discretion regarding fact- finding and discovery issues. [86]
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment gives individuals a right to a trial in accordance with basic legal principles. [87] Specifically, it states that an individual’s life, liberty, or property cannot be taken away through government action without safeguards and procedural due process. [88] Procedural due process includes elements of court proceedings that uphold an impartial adjudication. [89] Gorsuch argues that the SEC use of in-house proceedings violates the right of Jarkesy et al. to procedural due process. [90] At the federal court level, a defendant has the right to discovery for the evidence-gathering process and right to subpoena third party witness testimony. [91] Additionally, because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) are followed, the actual trial would include cross examinations and direct testimony from witnesses to avoid hearsay. [92] At the SEC in-house level, a defendant does not have discovery rights because the agency provides evidentiary support and documents. [93] ALJs are in charge of subpoenas and it is difficult for a defendant to convince the ALJ to subpoena third-party testimony that goes against the interests of the SEC. [94] The ALJ also has enormous discretion to apply the rules of evidence for the agency. Unlike the strict federal rules against hearsay, the ALJ is free to include sworn statements from supporting testimony that occurred outside of the courtroom. [95] The defendant’s legal team may find it difficult to verify the content in such statements, and cross examination of SEC-supporting witnesses is not possible because the witnesses themselves are not present in the courtroom. [96]
One remedy Jarkesy et al. appeared to have had access to was the appeals process. However, Gorsuch argues that this was strictly nominal and not an effective means of due process. With the in- house adjudication process, Jarkesy et al. would have to appeal to the SEC itself. [97] Again, the process here is far from independent because the Commission initiated the suit, hired the ALJ that ruled against Jarkesy et al., and approved the civil penalties imposed by the ALJ. [98] Therefore, the SEC can refuse to revisit the decision or it can decide to review the case and increase the level of civil penalties. [99] There is a potential, therefore, that upon appeal, the decision either remains the same or becomes more damaging to the defendant. Jarkesy et al. eventually charged the SEC in the U.S. District Court because his original appeal to the Commission simply led to the SEC reinforcing the ALJ’s ruling. [100]
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGULATORY STATE
In the dissenting opinion, Sotomayor argues that SEC v. Jarkesy challenges the ability of Congress to carry out a key responsibility: recognizing a key issue lacking sufficient remedy and utilizing statutory regulation schemes to address it. [101] The Great Depression, from the 1929 Wall Street Crash through the 1930s, served as an impetus to alter the landscape of the financial securities market. The key issue was an absence of both transparency and accountability in disclosures and business practices, leading to precarious and fraudulent investments met with the negligible authority of existing remedies. [102] In response to this problem, Congress enacted the antifraud provisions and statutorily equipped a federal agency, the SEC, with authority to carry out federal regulations. [103] The capacity of Congress to exercise this power was enshrined in the U.S. Constitution to protect public interest.
The majority opinion’s assertion that the imposition of civil penalties by governmental agencies falls under the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury in the federal court system directly challenges this key responsibility. Following the SEC, Congress has continued to enact regulatory schemes for federal agencies to uphold regulations via civil penalties. [104] For example, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), Department of Justice (DOJ), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) are among federal agencies using administrative law to enforce regulation. [105] In addition to the SEC, agencies like the EPA and Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) were established with the choice between in-house and federal court adjudication to carry out legal proceedings. [106] Other agencies, such as the USDA, FERC, and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) can only use in-house administrative proceedings. [107]
The initial purpose of delegating enforcement authority to federal agencies lies in expertise and efficiency. [108] With the relevant knowledge and expertise, each agency can focus on a particular area of regulation and increase the specificity of federal standards based on how their work evolves over time. For example, Congress can set general guidelines for consumer protection, but the FDA has the expertise to clarify those guidelines and detect the severity of violations and malpractice. The FDA can focus on specific food and drug products, with the resources to regulate manufacturing, disclosures, and selling, while holding companies accountable when those standards fail to be met. [109] In-house adjudication processes are based on this level of expertise as well as a need for efficiency with the size and scope of regulatory violations dealt via legal proceedings. Concentrating legal processes to agencies with specialized duties allows for greater refinement and uniformity in adjudication. [110] Additionally, the agencies themselves are most familiar with the relevant regulatory landscape, allowing them to better identify and address alleged infractions.
As a result of SEC v. Jarkesy, the ability of these agencies to carry out their basic functions is at stake. Some federal agencies have the choice to shift to federal court proceedings to adjudicate regulatory suits, but others that solely rely on in-house proceedings will have to receive an altered statute from Congress allowing them access to the federal court system. [111] Even if these agencies can shift over to federal court systems, abiding by the Court’s decision on the right to trial by jury, the amount of cases that the agencies can feasibly pursue will fall dramatically. Not only is it resource-intensive to carry out jury trials, the federal court system will be overburdened by the sheer volume of casework on the complexities of regulatory fields it is not familiar with. [112] The precedent set by SEC v. Jarkesy maintains the right for federal agencies to regulate via imposition of civil penalties, but it increasingly burdens and complicates the avenue to do so by upholding the right to trial by jury. Basic regulatory functions of public interest such as clean water, clean air, and safe food are now inundated with obstacles to make carrying out basic standards cumbersome, and at the expense of federal judges lacking the expertise on incredibly specific and specialized issues. [113] In efforts to dissect the regulatory state’s abiding by important constitutional principles of procedural justice and the separation of powers, SEC v. Jarkesy has planted the seeds to dismantle it.
Endnotes
[1] "SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. ___ (2024)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/603/22-859/#annotation.
[2] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[3] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[4] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[5] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[6] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[7] "Securities Law History." Legal Information Institute. Last modified October 2023. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securities_law_history.
[8] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[9] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[10] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[11] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[12] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[13 “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[14] "H.R.4173 - Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act." Library of Congress. https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-bill/4173/text.
[15] Eaglesham, Jean. "SEC Wins With In-House Judges." The Wall Street Journal, May 15, 2015. https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-wins-with-in-house-judges-1430965803.
[16] Eaglesham, “SEC Wins With In-House Judges.”
[17] Eaglesham, “SEC Wins With In-House Judges.”
[18] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[19] "Petition for Review of an Order of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission No. 3-15255." United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-859.html.
[20] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[21] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[22] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[23] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[24] "Seventh Amendment." Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/seventh_amendment.
[25] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[26] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[27] "The Federalist Papers: No. 83." Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library: The Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed83.asp.
[28] “Federalist No. 83,” The Avalon Project.
[29] “Federalist No. 83,” The Avalon Project.
[30] "Seventh Amendment," Legal Information Institute.
[31] "Seventh Amendment," Legal Information Institute.
[32] "The Seventh Amendment: Interpretation & Debate." National Constitution Center. https://constitutioncenter.org/the-constitution/amendments/amendment-vii/interpretations/125.
[33] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[34] "Article III Section 1: Legislative Courts Adjudicating Public Rights." Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-3/section-1/legislative-courts-adjudicating-public-rights.
35] “Article III Section 1,” Legal Information Institute.
[36] "Common Law." Legal Information Institute. Last modified May 2020. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/common_law.
[37] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[38] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[39] "Separation of Powers." Legal Information Institute. Last modified September 2024. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/separation_of_powers.
[40] “Separation of Powers,” Legal Information Institute.
[41] "The Federalist Papers: No. 47." Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library: The Avalon Project. https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed47.asp.
[42] "Nondelegation Doctrine." Legal Information Institute. Last modified July 2023. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nondelegation_doctrine.
[43] “Nondelegation Doctrine,” Legal Information Institute.
[44] "J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/276/394/.
[45] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[46] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[47] "Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/481/412/.
[48] "Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/430/442/.
[49] "Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/492/33/.
[50] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[51] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[52] "Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/488/361/.
[53] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[54] “Petition for Review,” Court of Appeals.
[55] "Article II." Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleii.
[56] "Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/272/52/.
[57] "Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/561/477/.
[58] "Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 585 U.S. ___ (2018)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/585/17-130/#tab-opinion-3918481.
[59 “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[60] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[61] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[62] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[63] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[64] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[65] "Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/59/272/#tab-opinion-1964018.
[66] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[67] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[68] "Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/564/462/#tab-opinion-1963620.
[69] "Common Law," Legal Information Institute.
[70] "Common Law," Legal Information Institute.
[71] "Common Law," Legal Information Institute.
[72] "Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/544/336/#tab-opinion-1961824.
[73] "Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/492/33/#tab-opinion-1958082.
[74] “Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,” Justia.
[75] “Granfinanciera v. Nordberg,” Justia.
[76] "Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)." Justia U.S. Supreme Court Center. https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/458/50/#tab-opinion-1954678.
[77] “Northern Pipeline v. Marathon,” Justia.
[78] "Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety," Justia.
[79] "Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety," Justia.
[80] "Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety," Justia.
[81] "Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety," Justia.
[82] "Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety," Justia.
[83] "Article III." Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/articleiii.
[84] "Dodd-Frank," Library of Congress.
[85] "Administration Law Judge." Legal Information Institute. Last modified November 2021. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/administrative_law_judge_(alj).
[86] “Administrative Law Judge,” Legal Information Institute.
[87] "Due Process." Legal Information Institute. Last modified October 2022. https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/due_process.
[88] "Due Process," Legal Information Institute.
[89] "Due Process," Legal Information Institute.
[90] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[91] "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Legal Information Institute. https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp.
[92] "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure," Legal Information Institute.
[93] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[94] “Administrative Law Judge,” Legal Information Institute.
[95] “Administrative Law Judge,” Legal Information Institute.
[96] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[97] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[98] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[99] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[100] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[101] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[102] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[103] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[104] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[105] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[106] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[107] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[108] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[109] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[110] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[111] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[112] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.
[113] “SEC v. Jarkesy,” Justia.