By: Tess O’Donoghue
Volume X – Issue I – Fall 2024
During the consequential 2023–2024 Supreme Court term, one key case received minimal media attention: City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, which essentially criminalized homelessness by allowing city governments to fine and jail the unsheltered homeless for sleeping in public. Oral arguments involved three main subjects of debate: the extent to which homelessness is involuntary and should be considered a protected status, whether the City’s response to homelessness constitutes “cruel and unusual” punishment, and how the law relates to the City’s policy-making authority. The majority held that “the enforcement of generally applicable laws regulating camping on public property does not constitute ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.” [1]
This article will proceed in three parts. First, it will situate the City’s law within the context of local and national homelessness and describe the relevant precedents that framed the justices’ disposition. Secondly, it will report and discuss arguments on both sides addressing the three core questions of the case. Finally, it will consider the current and potential impacts of the majority’s ruling. This analysis will demonstrate that contrary to the Court’s ruling, a law that imposes fines and jail time on unhoused people who sleep in public spaces violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment by inflicting an inescapable cycle of debt and imprisonment upon American citizens. A number of states and municipalities have adopted and others are considering adopting laws similar to those presented to the Court, putting millions of vulnerable Americans who lack an alternative course of action at risk of descending into permanent homelessness.
I. BACKGROUND
i. The Reality of Homelessness in the U.S. and Grants Pass
A court must evaluate each case on its merits while considering how a decision could be applied to other contexts once it joins the body of constitutional law. Too often, however, the full lived experiences of many people affected by a particular case are left out of the Court’s analysis entirely. In Grants Pass, Justice Sotomayor opens and closes her dissent by reminding her readers of their stories, establishing that “homelessness in America is a complex and heartbreaking crisis” caused by stagnant wages, domestic abuse, disability, and other tragic factors outside individual control. [2] An analysis of this case should be similarly grounded in reality.
According to the United States Interagency Council on Homelessness, “[i]n effect, more than half of Americans live paycheck to paycheck and one crisis away from homelessness.” [3] And, for each day a person goes without a home, their chance of getting back on their feet drops, and their chance of falling into chronic homelessness rises. [4] As a result, “roughly 650,000 people in America were homeless on any given night” in 2023. [5] Forty percent of these people “are unsheltered, sleeping ‘in places not meant for human habitation,’ such as sidewalks, abandoned buildings, bus or train stations, camping grounds, and parked vehicles.” [6]
In Grants Pass, a city with a population of roughly 40,000, [7] there are more than 600 unhoused people, and Gospel Rescue Mission, the only entity in the city that offers a temporary place to sleep, has fewer than 100 beds available. [8] Regardless, per the city’s two “anti-camping” ordinances, a “park exclusion” ordinance, and a “park exclusion appeals” ordinance, it is illegal to sleep on sidewalks, streets, or alleyways; start a fire on public property; or park overnight in a city park. [9] Grants Pass defines “campsite” broadly, “as any place a homeless person is while covered with a blanket.” [10] When an unhoused person violates these ordinances, he is first fined $295, which increases to $537.60 if the first fine is unpaid; if he is cited again for violating the regulation within one year, he is barred from city parks for thirty days; finally, if he remains in the park, he is criminally charged with trespassing and can be subjected to up to 30 days in jail and a $1,250 fine. [11]
The case cites multiple interactions between the unhoused and the police, which demonstrate the unique position of powerlessness that the homeless inhabit. [12] A driver pulled over for a traffic violation may successfully convince the officer not to issue a ticket or contest it in writing, but unhoused people have no such influence. When a young woman in Grants Pass received a ticket, she explained that she could not find shelter, but the officer responded by throwing her only belongings in the trash and calling them “rubbish.” [13] Another Grants Pass resident who had experienced homelessness for twenty years couldn’t access housing because his arrests interrupted communication with his outreach worker. [14] A disabled Marine Corps veteran was arrested repeatedly for sleeping in public and lost all of his belongings, including the tools he used to make a living, on each occasion. [15] A woman received 30 tickets totaling $9,000 in fines in the past year and a half alone. She sees these fines, which she cannot afford to pay, as tickets “for existing.” [16] These are just a handful of the many stories that illustrate how Grants Pass’s laws destroy the lives of people who have no other options, making the lives of the most vulnerable among us unlivable.
ii. Relevant Precedents
The foundational precedent for this case is Robinson v. California (1962), in which the petitioner challenged a California statute that criminalized being addicted to narcotics. In its decision, the Supreme Court made a distinction between behavior and status, ruling that a person “could be arrested for using illegal drugs–a behavior–but not for being addicted to them, a status.” [17] Robinson determined that the Eighth Amendment set “limits on what can be made criminal and punished as such” in addition to regulating the punishments themselves. [18] Six years later, the Court decided Powell v. Texas (1968), which concerned laws criminalizing public drunkenness. The majority noted that the Eighth Amendment has historically been applied to limit specific punishments, not the government’s right to punish certain acts. Robinson did not apply because the Powell defendant was convicted for “being in public while drunk on a particular occasion,” not “for being [an] alcoholic.” [19] Four dissenting justices vigorously opposed the prosecution of conditions that individuals lack the power to change. [20]
The Court applied Powell’s reasoning in Jones v. United States (1983) and Kahler v. Kansas (2020). In Jones, the Court held that the government may confine a criminal defendant to a mental institution based on an insanity judgment. [21] In Kahler, the Court concluded that, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, a state need not adopt an insanity test to measure whether or not the defendant can recognize that his behavior is wrong. [22] The Grants Pass majority relied on these two precedents [23] and criticized the dissent for not discussing them. [24]
Finally, the Court considered Martin v. Boise, a 2018 case decided by the Ninth Circuit that concerns a law very similar to that of Grants Pass. Robert Martin, an unhoused man in Boise, Idaho, was charged with violating a city ordinance against camping in public, and he sued Boise on the grounds that its ordinance was inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. After Martin prevailed in district court, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the lack of shelter beds in Boise made Martin’s homelessness involuntary and, consequently, immune from punishment. As a result, the public camping ordinance could not be enforced if the number of unhoused people exceeds the number of “practically available” shelter beds. [25] Boise appealed, but the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari.
iii. Case Facts
In October 2018, the Oregon Law Center filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of Debra Blake, asserting that Martin outlawed the cruel and unusual punishments inflicted by the City of Grants Pass against its unhoused by imposing fines for sleeping in public. The district court agreed, recognizing the involuntary nature of homelessness and ruling that the fines imposed violated the Eighth Amendment because they were designed to deter the unhoused from living in Grants Pass and were disproportionate to the act of sleeping in public. [26] In July 2020, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a Martin injunction to prevent the city from enforcing its laws. [27]
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment– and went one step further in favor of the plaintiffs. The panel believed that prohibiting stoves, fires, or makeshift dwellings left unhoused people vulnerable to the elements and effectively deprived them of sleep. Consequently, the panel remanded the case and instructed the district court “to craft a narrower injunction recognizing Plaintiffs’ limited right to. protection against the elements, as well as limitations when a shelter bed is available.” [28] When Grants Pass’s request for a rehearing en banc was denied, attorneys for the city then filed a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court, which was granted in January 2024. [29]
Since 2018, when the Ninth Circuit decided Martin v. Boise and Blake filed her complaint against Grants Pass, homelessness had risen a whopping 5.36 percent nationwide. [30] Politicians and organizations on both sides of the aisle had called for clarification of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Boise, which has governed responses to homelessness throughout the West for the past six years. They asked the court to clarify the definition of “adequate shelter” and “involuntarily homeless” and stipulate what cities are required to provide. [31] On June 28, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit’s ruling. Justice Gorsuch wrote the majority opinion, joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, Alito, Kavanaugh, and Barrett. [32] Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Sotomayor wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kagan and Jackson.
Throughout oral argument, the justices sought to clarify the scope of Grants Pass’s ordinances to determine if striking them down would prevent the city from addressing public health and safety concerns. Counsel for the unhoused stated clearly that plaintiffs were not challenging Grants Pass’s ability to “ban tents[;] clear encampments[; or prohibit] littering, public urination, defecation, drug use and violent or harassing behavior.” [33] If the court ruled against the petitioners, Grants Pass could continue to fine people with “physical and legal access to” a shelter, including shelters outside of city lines. [34] Instead, the essential question of the case is whether the government could– at any time and in any public location within the city– punish people who slept in public because they had nowhere else to go.
II. QUESTIONS FACING THE COURT
To make the case for Grants Pass’s ordinances, Theane D. Evangelis, the attorney for the City of Grants Pass, raised three main arguments that were discussed in this case: (1) The Ninth Circuit misread the meaning of Robinson and abandoned the holding of Powell by treating homelessness as a status; (2) the Eighth Amendment governs the nature of punishments imposed, not whether or not they can be imposed, and is not relevant to Grants Pass’s ordinances; and (3) municipalities could not practically implement the appellate ruling. [35]
i. Is Homelessness a Status?
The Court ruled that Grants Pass’s ordinances do not implicate Robinson because, as Evangelis argued, they do not criminalize status. The ruling relied on Powell v. Texas (1968), in which the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting public drunkenness, even by those with addictions to alcohol. In the eyes of the Grants Pass majority, “this case is no different from Powell” because the challenged laws target specific actions, not statuses; thus, Robinson does not apply. [36] In other words, the Powell Court rejected the argument that the plaintiff’s alcoholism left him without control over when and where he became drunk. Similarly, the Grants Pass majority argued, bringing a blanket or tent to a public park for the night is a distinguishable, deliberate act; because one could avoid violating the law by moving to the next town over, deciding to stay in town is criminal. To distinguish the criminalized behaviors from homelessness, the majority highlighted a challenged Grants Pass ordinance that prevents people from sleeping with bedding, a chair, or any other materials that could be used to remain “in a single location of City property for more than 24 hours,” regardless of “whether or not 24 hours have passed.” [37]
To come to this conclusion, the Court rejected the reasoning presented by the advocate for the Respondents, Kelsi B. Corkan, which argued that homelessness should be considered a status and how the City criminalizes it. Evangelis argued that homelessness is not a Robinson status because a person can be homeless one day and housed the next; [38] in response, Corkran reminded the Court that Robinson established that the “permanency of the condition” does not affect whether or not it is a status. [39] She further defined “status” as “something that you are[,] apart from anything you do” and listed “having cancer” or “being poor” as examples. [40] She argued that “adding a universal human attribute [such as the need for sleep] to the definition of the offense” does not “make the punishment conduct-based instead of status-based.” [41] Therefore, Corkran concluded, the City’s ordinances punish on the basis of status because an unhoused person without shelter cannot suppress his need to sleep.
Furthermore, the majority’s reliance on Powell as a precedent was misplaced because Grants Pass is distinguishable from Powell in both the nature of the behavior in question and the significance of the public setting. In Powell, the justices concluded that a state need not decide “what part of a defendant’s personality is responsible for their actions” (italics added). [42] The question of Grants Pass is not one of “personality” or of mental state, as it was in Kahler; it is a question of “an essential bodily function.” [43] And, while the plaintiff in Powell could enter a private space before drinking, unsheltered homelessness by definition exists in public. If a person is without a home and cannot access a shelter bed, there is no place in the city where they can legally exist.
Finally, although the majority claims that the challenged ordinances evenly apply to the housed and unhoused, they clearly target those without an alternative place to sleep. The text empowers officers to regulate the use of bedding or sleeping bags in public only when it is “for the purpose of maintaining a temporary place to live,” [44] and Grants Pass police officers reported that “someone violates the Ordinance only if he or she does not ‘have another home to go to.’” [45] By asserting that this statute applies to all people, from the unhoused to tourists to backpackers to protestors, [46] the majority turned a blind eye to the reality on the ground in which only unhoused people had received tickets for sleeping in public spaces while stargazers with sleeping bags were permitted to sleep in public. [47] In this way, Grants Pass’ ordinances explicitly target people experiencing homelessness, a Robinson status that should be protected.
ii. To What Extent is the Eighth Amendment Applicable?
The Court considered two questions regarding the application of the Eighth Amendment to this case: whether the City should be permitted to impose any punishments for sleeping in public, and whether the punishments it has imposed are “cruel and unusual.” The majority decided that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause only considers the nature of punishments imposed, not whether or not a behavior can be criminalized. It also ruled that the fines and jail time imposed by Grants Pass were neither cruel nor unusual. [48]
Firstly, the majority established that the Eighth Amendment does not speak to a city’s ability to criminalize a behavior. This contradicts the Court’s ruling in Robinson, which established that the number of days of imprisonment was irrelevant because simply imposing a criminal penalty upon people who could not change their behavior violates the Eighth Amendment. [49] To address this, the Grants Pass majority depicted Robinson as an anomaly in the history of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence but did not overturn it; rather, the Court repeated its assertion that Robinson does not apply because Grants Pass’s ordinances do not criminalize status. Secondly, the Court determined that the meaning of “cruel and unusual” does not apply to the fines and jail time that Grants Pass imposed. The majority relied on an outdated understanding of the phrase “cruel and unusual,” noting that, in the eighteenth century, “cruel and unusual punishments” included “drawing and quartering or public dissection.” [50] It further argued that “limited fines for first-time offenders” are not cruel or unusual because “they are not designed to cause ‘terror, pain, or disgrace’” (italics added). [51]
To determine whether it is “unusual” to punish a person without shelter for sleeping in public, it is essential to consider the context within which this behavior exists, or more specifically, how the experience of homelessness in the U.S. fits into the global landscape. Housing is significantly less affordable than in other industrialized nations; in 2022, roughly 50% of low-income private tenants spent more than 40% of their income on rent. [52] This is 15% higher than the average among countries in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), and it makes homelessness almost impossible for the American poor to avoid. In addition, the U.S. had a higher rate of unsheltered homelessness than almost all of its OECD peers in 2023. [53] Therefore, the U.S. is quite “unusual” not only in the high rates of homelessness its citizens experience but also in its lack of temporary shelters. By ignoring the outsized contribution of economic conditions and public policies– which the unhoused cannot control– to the existence of homelessness in the U.S., the City severed the behaviors associated with homelessness from their proper context. In turn, it has imposed punishment without full consideration of the factors that contributed to the “crime,” which is both irresponsible and unusual. In addition, Justice Sotomayor rightly pointed out that “the burdens of homelessness fall disproportionately on the most vulnerable in our society,” [54] such as those from low-income backgrounds, people with disabilities and mental illnesses, veterans, and immigrants, among others. Criminalizing homelessness is “cruel and unusual” because it targets the vulnerable people who experience this status, [55] regardless of the punishment imposed.
The Court was also remiss in its characterization of the punishments imposed by the City; by relying on the Framers’ view of the Eighth Amendment, the majority overlooked the long-lasting harms that the ordinances caused. Contrary to the majority opinion, Weems v. United States (1910) and Trop v. Dulles (1958) established that the Court is not bound by the Framer’s understanding of “cruel and unusual;” rather, the Amendment must be applied based on “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” [56] A “maturing society” should not view punishment in isolation but must consider cascading implications. The penalty fine is essentially a tax on homelessness because it only applies to those who cannot pay the initial ticket and it mandates incarceration for those who remain unable to pay. In turn, a criminal record makes the difficult process of finding employment or housing while homeless even more challenging. Therefore, as the Ninth Circuit concluded, the Eighth Amendment applies to Grants Pass because civil penalties “can ‘later… become criminal offenses.’” Justice Thomas refutes this, suggesting in his concurrence that the potential for criminal penalties does not warrant the application of the Eighth Amendment to the initial civic penalties. [57] But if an unhoused person cannot find shelter or pay his fines, the transformation of his civil penalty into a criminal offense is beyond his control. Indeed, Evangelis herself conceded that if homelessness were considered a status under Robinson, Grants Pass’ ordinances would violate the Eighth Amendment. [58]
iii. Is the Ninth Circuit’s Ruling Workable?
The majority opinion decided that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling was “unworkable” because governments cannot be held responsible for determining what constitutes involuntary behavior or how many shelter beds are “practically available.” [59] Furthermore, the opinion stated that federal courts’ intervention to protect the unhoused would violate the agency of “the American people” in these matters.
Many experts have pointed out that the City’s response does not seek to reduce homelessness but simply to reduce its visibility by forcing unsheltered people into jails or out of town. [60] To illustrate this, the dissent cites a study in which 91 percent of recipients of a “move-along order” continued to live outside, only walking two or three blocks away. [61] This demonstrates that the city’s punishments did not incentivize unhoused people to seek shelter. Edwin Kneedler, an independent attorney, presented a relevant amicus curiae statement to the Court in which he argued that the government cannot make “it unlawful for a person to reside in the jurisdiction” simply because of their status. Indeed, if every town implemented such ordinances, as this ruling allows, an unhoused person would be unable to exist. They would have no choice but to constantly move from town to town, away from friends, family, community ties, familiar resources, and any chance of escaping homelessness. [62]
The majority also fails to establish how fines and jail time remedy the issues that plague homeless encampments, such as sexual assault, drug abuse, and unsanitary conditions. [63] As the dissent points out, move-along orders push unhoused people into unfamiliar areas where they are more vulnerable to rape and other forms of violence, [64] and the criminalization of homelessness discourages people from calling the police in such emergencies. [65] This suggests that homelessness policy is perhaps less workable with such ordinances than without them.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is impractical to relieve city leaders of their responsibility to consider the availability of shelter beds, one of the key determinants of homelessness, as they create their laws. Grants Pass’s shelter has beds for less than a quarter of its homeless population, [66] and disincentivizing efforts to address such a shortage places the onus on homeless people to find shelter that doesn’t exist. By relieving cities of this responsibility, the majority empowers them to pursue incomplete policy solutions that do not account for the immediate, basic needs of the unhoused. For instance, Evangelis highlighted an element of Grants Pass’s policy that she believes to be “an important part of the puzzle” of addressing homelessness: unhoused people are often connected with substance abuse treatment programs after being jailed. What the Court failed to acknowledge is that unhoused people– with or without substance abuse issues– still lack a place to sleep when they are released from jail. [67 ]And when the basic human need for shelter is not met, we deny people the chance to address their other mental and physical health concerns and to escape homelessness.
When oral arguments were heard, the central question in the case– whether the government could, at any time and in any public location within the city, punish people who slept in public because they had nowhere else to go– was no longer relevant to the City of Grants Pass. In 2023, Oregon passed Rev. Stat. §195.530, which states, “Any city or county law that regulates the acts of sitting, lying, sleeping or keeping warm and dry outdoors on public property that is open to the public must be objectively reasonable as to time, place and manner with regards to persons experiencing homelessness.” [68] Because the ordinances that were the subject of this case constitute a 24/7, citywide ban, they were no longer legal under §195.530, and it would have been appropriate for the Court to refrain from ruling on this question. [69] This casts doubt on the majority’s assertion that, by preserving the ordinances, it had exercised judicial restraint and left the issue of homelessness up to “the democratic process.” [70] In reality, the Court actively rejected the decision of Oregon voters and vastly expanded the authority of city leaders to infringe on vulnerable individuals’ Eighth Amendment rights.
III. MOVING FORWARD
The Court’s ruling in Grants Pass v. Johnson is already wreaking havoc on cities like Chico, California, where officials are weaponizing the Grants Pass decision against the unhoused. The settlement of Warren v. Chico (2022), which relied on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Martin v. Boise, required Chico to document the numbers of unhoused residents and available shelter beds before enforcing its anti-camping ordinances or seizing private property. [71] Replicating the language used by Justice Gorsuch in the majority opinion, Chico now claims the Warren Settlement agreement has proven “unworkable.” [72] On August 31, 2024, barely two months after the Court issued its ruling and rejected Martin v. Boise, Chico filed a motion to withdraw from the Warren Settlement. [73] Legal Services of Northern California (LSNC), which represented the unhoused plaintiffs in Warren v. Chico, expressed willingness to renegotiate the agreement; however, contrary to the outcome of Grants Pass, LSNC is insisting that the city assess unhoused individuals and refer them to adequate shelter within 72 hours of eviction. It argues that destroying the Warren Settlement would decrease leaders’ incentive to craft policies that actually reduce homelessness and treat unhoused people with dignity and care. [74] At the time of publication, this case has not been decided. Regardless of the outcome of this case, Grants Pass has dramatically altered the attitude of Chico officials towards unhoused community members; for example, in early August, the city initiated an eviction sweep without issuing a press release, abandoning its customary approach. [75] It is a tragic indication of what’s to come in cities and towns across the United States.
In addition to causing immediate distress among the unhoused, this decision will have long-term consequences for Americans’ well-being and economic mobility. The Covenant House, one of the largest charities in North and Central America for young victims of homelessness and trafficking, fears that unhoused youth will increasingly be branded with criminal records that follow them for the rest of their lives and that the threat of criminalization will prevent victims of human trafficking and sexual abuse from escaping. [76] Indeed, Grants Pass’s ordinances are a counterintuitive expenditure of state funds and police because they create a tax on homelessness that’s nearly impossible to pay. As the U.S. Interagency Council on Homelessness articulated, the criminalization of homelessness creates a “revolving door that circulates individuals experiencing homelessness from the street to the criminal justice system and back.” [77]
The Court’s failure to fully consider the harms that Grants Pass’s punishments inflict weakens the argument that the Amendment should be applied based on “evolving standards of decency.” This argument has been used to secure access to healthcare in prison, limit solitary confinement, prohibit the death penalty for people under eighteen and those with intellectual disabilities, and require that “juries consider people’s individual, often trauma-filled lives before deciding whether to send them to death row.” [78] The Court’s ruling puts all of these protections at risk.
There is a glimmer of hope. In her powerful dissent, Justice Sotomayor encouraged future claimants considering the constitutionality of similar laws to apply the Fourth Amendment or the Due Process Clause, [79] which Justice Gorsuch expressed interest in. [80] These doctrines could potentially restore homelessness as a status deserving of protection in the eyes of the Court. Regardless, people must dismantle false stereotypes about homelessness and the barriers we erect to hide it from view. Cities must take action to provide more people with a place to sleep.
IV. CONCLUSION
As city leaders throughout the U.S. struggled to address rising homelessness, they came to the Supreme Court with a gaping wound and a band-aid solution. Instead of acknowledging the wound, the Court pushed the bandaid down with the force of the Constitution. Justice Sotomayor writes in her dissent that upholding the City of Grants Pass’ laws presents the unhoused “with an impossible choice: Either stay awake or be arrested.” [81] Indeed, the majority treats homelessness as a political matter that the “democratic process” should resolve, [82] not a crisis shattering Americans’ ability to meet their basic needs, let alone participate in that process. In this way, the Court denies its duty to ensure the Bill of Rights includes “the most vulnerable among us,” [83] particularly when “doing so is uncomfortable or unpopular.” [84] As the tragic consequences of City of Grants Pass v. Johnson are felt nationwide, municipal leaders and Americans must look beyond bandaids to address this wound. They must look beyond the view of six justices and boldly choose to treat the unhoused as who they are: people.
Endnotes
[1] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 603 U.S. ___, 2 (2024), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf.
[2] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, 603 U.S. ___, 1 (2024) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-175_19m2.pdf.
[3] “History of Homelessness,” Homelessness Data & Trends, United States Interagency Council on Homelessness, accessed November 3, 2024, www.usich.gov/guidance-reports-data/data-trends.
[4] Ezra Klein, host, The Ezra Klein Show, “What We Learned From the Deepest Look at Homelessness in Decades,” The New York Times, July 18, 2023, at 24:30, podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-ezra-klein-show/id1548604447?i=1000621491531.
[5] “Criminalizing Homelessness Won't Make It Go Away,” The New York Times, New York City, NY, April 2024, educational video, at 1:12, www.youtube.com/watch?v=SE_S-dY5ZHM.
[6] Tanya de Sousa et al., “The 2023 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress,” The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, December 2023, 2, https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/2023-ahar-part-1.Pdf.
[7] “Grants Pass City, Oregon,” QuickFacts, United States Census Bureau, accessed November 29, 2024, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/grantspasscityoregon/POP060210.
[8] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 00:04:41–00:05:00).
[9] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 11.
[10] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 01:49:00–01:49:05).
[11] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 8–9.
[12] Christopher Mayer and Jessica Reichert, “The Intersection of Homelessness and the Criminal Justice System,” The Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, July 3, 2018, https://icjia.illinois.gov/researchhub/articles/the-intersection-of-homelessness-and-the-criminal-justice-system.
[13] “Homeless Woman Shares How Grants Pass is Ticketting and Throwing Away Her Belongings,” InvisiblePeople, Grants Pass, Oregon, June 20, 2024, at 0:40, https://www.youtube.com/shorts/kHy9S6VVy2c.
[14] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 7.
[15] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 6.
[16] “Criminalizing Homelessness,” at 3:50.
[17] Maureen Groppe, “Supreme Court Takes Up Homelessness As Record Numbers of Americans Lack Permanent Housing,” USA Today, April 22, 2024, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2024/04/21/supreme-court-ticketing-cruel-punishment/73405633007/.
[18] Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep430/usrep430651/usrep430651.pdf.
[19] Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531–532 (1968), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep392/usrep392514/usrep392514.pdf.
[20] “Powell v. Texas,” Oyez, accessed November 3, 2024, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1967/405.
[21] Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/463/354/#opinions.
[22] “Kahler v. Kansas,” Oyez, accessed November 3, 2024, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6135.
[23] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 23.
[24] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 32.
[25] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 1.
[26] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 27.
[27] “City of Grants Pass v. Johnson,” Oyez, accessed November 3, 2024, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2023/23-175.
[28] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 10.
[29] "City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson,” SCOTUSblog, accessed November 3, 2024, www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/city-of-grants-pass-oregon-v-johnson/.
[30] “State of Homelessness: 2024 Edition,” Homelessness in America, National Alliance to End Homelessness, accessed November 3, 2024, endhomelessness.org/homelessness-in-america/homelessness-statistics/state-of-homelessness/#homelessness-trends-over-time.
[31] Katrin Bennhold, host, The Daily, “The Supreme Court Takes Up Homelessness,” The New York Times, April 19, 2024, at 19:00, www.nytimes.com/2024/04/19/podcasts/the-daily/supreme-court-homelessness.html.
[32] "City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson.”
[33] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 01:50:24–01:50:34).
[34] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 01:57:27–01:57:40).
[35] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 00:00:55–00:01:10).
[36] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 23.
[37] “City of Grants Pass Municipal Code” (Grants Pass, Oregon), 5.61.010, https://www.grantspassoregon.gov/DocumentCenter/View/38/Title-5--Nuisances-and-Offenses-?bidId=.
[38] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 00:10:23–00:10:37 and 00:29:54–00:29:57).
[39] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 02:20:29–02:20:44).
[40] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 01:53:12–01:53:55).
[41] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 01:49:40–01:49:51).
[42] Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, at 540–541.
[43] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 16.
[44] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 14.
[45] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 18.
[46] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 20.
[47] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 14.
[48] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 3.
[49] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 11.
[50] Maurice Chammah, Shannon Heffernan, and Beth Schwartzapfel, “This Supreme Court Case on Homelessness May Limit Prisoner Rights and Expand Executions,” The Marshall Project, April 10, 1014, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2024/04/10/supreme-court-homeless-grants-pass-originalism?gad_source=1&gclid=Cj0KCQjwjY64BhCaARIsAIfc7YY9-cVXPbyDLjst5jlSxyEldD8e2R9etQcE5WT_UAseEmvp1Lp-SYcaAkzEEALw_wcB.
[51] Bucklew v. Precythe, 87 U.S., 130 (2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/18pdf/17-8151_1qm2.pdf.
[52] “Affordable Housing,” OECD, accessed November 3, 2024, https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/affordable-housing.html.
[53] “Population Experiencing Homelessness,” Affordable Housing Database, OECD, 2023, https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/data/datasets/affordable-housing-database/hc3-1-homeless-population.pdf.
[54] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 4.
[55] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 29.
[56] Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958), https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep356/usrep356086/usrep356086.pdf.
[57] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 41.
[58] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 00:49:59–00:50:28).
[59] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 27.
[60] Bennhold, “The Supreme Court,” at 8:20.
[61] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 6.
[62] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 00:54:40–00:55:10).
[63] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 3.
[64] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 30.
[65 Bennhold, “The Supreme Court.,” 23.
[66] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 22.
[67] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 00:45:27–00:45:43).
[68] OR. Rev. Stat. §195.530(2)(2023), https://www.oregonlegislature.gov/bills_laws/ors/ors195.html.
[69] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 01:47:54–01:48:21).
[70] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 10.
[71] “Warren v. Chico Settlement Agreement,” (Chico, California, 2022), https://policycommons.net/artifacts/2459830/warren-v/3481627/.
[72] City of Chico, “Warren v. City of Chico – Alternate Site,” news release, August 8, 2024, 2, https://chico.ca.us/documents/City-of-Chico-Press-Release-Alternate-Site-08-08-2024-FINAL.pdf.
[73] Hannah Gutierrez, “Chico Files Motion to Withdraw from Warren v. Chico Settlement, Cites Grants Pass Ruling,” abc7 KRCR, September 3, 2024, https://www.krcrtv.com/news/local/chico-files-motion-to-withdraw-from-warren-v-chico-settlement-cites-grants-pass-ruling.
[74] Matt Wreden, “Plaintiffs File Objection to Chico’s Efforts to Overturn Warren Settlement,” Action News Now, September 26, 2024, https://www.actionnewsnow.com/news/plaintiffs-file-objection-to-chicos-efforts-to-overturn-warren-settlement/article_bdcf7608-7c40-11ef-87cb-b31623cef2e7.html.
[75] Leslie Layton, “Plaintiffs Respond to City As It Tries to Extricate Itself from Warren,” ChicoSol, August 7, 2024, https://chicosol.org/2024/08/07/plaintiffs-respond-city-tries-extricate-warren/.
[76] “Overview of the Johnson v. Grants Pass Ruling,” Covenant House, June 28, 2024, https://www.covenanthouse.org/news/johnson-v-grants-pass-decision.
[77] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___, at 6.
[78] Chammah, Heffernan, and Schwartzapfel, “This Supreme Court Case.”
[79] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 28–29.
[80] City of Grants Pass v. Johnson, Docket No. 23–175, 603 U.S. ___ (U.S. Supreme Court, Apr. 22, 2024, Oral Argument at 02:02:38–02:03:19).
[81] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 2.
[82] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ , at 10.
[83] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 30.
[84] City of Grants Pass, 603 U.S. ___ (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), at 2.